



Scaling Interoperable Trust through a Trustmark Marketplace

Georgia Tech Research Institute
December 2013

This work was performed under the following financial assistance award 70NANB13H189 from the U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology

The Trustmark Pilot Team



In the Beginning...

Lots of Application-Specific Identity Silos

Application A

Application B

Application C


Application D

Application E




Along Came Federated Identity...


Decouple Identities from Applications!



Along Came Federated Identity...



Along Came Federated Identity...



So what about Trust, Liability, Security?

And Today...

Lots of Federated Identity Silos

Trust
Framework X

Info Sharing
Environment Y

Federation Z




Community of
Interest ABC

Other Federation




Current State of the Identity Ecosystem



There exist many Trust Frameworks.



Current State of the Identity Ecosystem






Each Trust Framework requires agreement across many dimensions.




Current State of the Identity Ecosystem

Many Trust Frameworks are monolithic and opaque.






Achieving Cross-Framework Trust






Option #1: User Creates a New Identity

But now she has to manage multiple identities!






Option #2: IDP Joins New Trust Framework

But joining a new Trust Framework is complex and expensive!






Option #3: RP Joins New Trust Framework

Same problem here:
Joining a new Trust Framework is complex
and expensive!






Option #4: Cross-Framework Relationship

But this is fraught with challenges at many layers: technical, policy, legal, etc.



Option #5: Bilateral IDP-RP Relationship

But this is highly UN-scalable and also fraught with challenges.



The Perspective from the LE Community

Law Enforcement COI has over 1 million people in the US alone

Over 10,000 US LE agencies

Required to share data across jurisdictions

But must obey applicable access controls when sharing

LE agencies are autonomous (NOT centrally funded)

Trust between agencies is a fundamental requirement

3rd party trust is required due to COI size and complexity

Most users must have high-assurance credentials

Legitimate business need to interact with many other COIs

LE agencies are highly heterogeneous

Federal Agencies

State Agencies

Local Agencies

Tribal Agencies

Task Forces

Fusion Centers

The Perspective from the LE Community



Global Federated Identity and Privilege Management



Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Outreach & Marketing Resources	OJP Portal	Doc Map	Term Matrix	Web Site	Overview Doc	Exec Overview	Training Modules	Web Svc CONOPS
								Alignment CONOPS Mobile CONOPS
Technical Assistance Resources	Impl Guide	Ref Federation	U2S Impl Kit	S2S Impl Kit	Impl Web Portal	Join-or-Build?	TIB Onboarding Guide	
Communication Profiles	Web Browser User-to-System Profile	Web Services System-to-System Profile	Mobile Device App Profile	REST Web Services System-to-System Profile	BAE Profile			
Core Tech. Standards & Guidelines	Metadata 1.0	Crypto Trust Model	Fed. CPS Template	Fed. Member CP Template				
	Metadata 2.0							
Fed. Org. Guidelines	Gov. Guideline	Operational Policies & Procedures Guideline	Membership Agreements Set	Federation Audit Policy	Federation Attribute Release Policy			






Legend:
 [White Box] Normative Spec
 [Blue Box] Complete & Approved (if applicable)
 [Yellow Box] Under Development (Timeline TBD)
 [Green Diamond] Published or Released Since Pw. DT Mtg.
 [Yellow Diamond] Likely to be Updated in 2013
 [Red Circle] Deprecated and/or Out-of-Data



The Perspective from the LE Community



The Perspective from the LE Community



Some NIEF Members

Texas Department of Public Safety

TXMAP Web Mapping Application

what is it?

The TXMAP application is a multi-faceted data mapping and reporting tool created by the Texas Department of Public Safety. TXMAP provides users access to a variety of data ranging from secure critical infrastructure and



Post Office Box 12729
Tennessee, FL 32317
(850) 383-0600
www.iir.com

CargoNet

The Cargo Theft Prevention and Recovery Network

what is it?

CargoNet provides a multi-layered solution to the cargo theft problem. CargoNet helps prevent cargo theft and increases recovery rates by facilitating secure information sharing among theft victims, their business partners, and law enforcement. CargoNet offers a 24 hours a day, 7 days a week fusion center and cargo recovery network – staffed

Regional Information Sharing Systems® (RISS)

The RISS Program is funded by Congress and administered by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U. S. Department of Justice (DOJ).

The RISS BNET Portal currently provides secure access to services and resources to more than 9,000 federal, state, local, and tribal law member enforcement agencies as well as public safety and Critical Infrastructure / Key Resource (CI / KR) communities. In addition, RISS' participation in NIEF allows RISS to provide different levels of authorization to NIEF users based upon user attributes.

- RISS Resources available to all federated partner users:
 - RISS ATIX Website - RISS TechPage - IntelINK-U
- RISS Resources available only to Sworn Law Enforcement Officers (SLEO) or those acting for SLEO:
 - RISS National Gang Program (RISSGang) Web Site- RISS Officer Safety Website - Cold Case Locator System, National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center (NCIRC) - National Motor Vehicle Title Information System (NMVTIS) - Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI) Search Tool (must have SAR account) - Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) Electronic Learning Portal (ELP)

Contact: Larry Maloney
(703)941-2100 x2100



RISS – A Proven Resource for Law Enforcement™

HSIN is the nation's platform for sharing sensitive but unclassified information – enabling the Homeland Security Enterprise, its Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial



Apiary Threat Intelligence Framework


What is Apiary?

Apiary is an automated framework for malware analysis and threat intelligence. Members of our vetted community anonymously upload malware and benefit from the ongoing addition of in-depth malware correlation and behavior analysis. The results are delivered automatically within a secure sharing environment for analysts, investigators, and incident responders to protect their organization.

Who uses Apiary

Apiary is currently being used in both the private and public sector. The community includes organizations from many industries including finance, oil and gas, utilities, retail, and more. Additionally, Apiary is used by local, state, and federal government organizations including law enforcement and education. The

Apiary processes samples per day and 'picture' relationship samples. Our analytical edge research malware research, the Apiary community analysis process amongst a trusted confidentiality make



LA County Criminal History

Target Audience – Law Enforcement, Probation and Prosecution

CCHRS is the LA County Criminal History System used by Investigators and Prosecutors for filing criminal cases within LA County. It contains over 12,000,000 subjects with their record of arrests, convictions, sentences, custody status, probation status, demographics and biometric identifiers. Over 44 local police agencies, LA Sheriff, LA District Attorney and LA Probation utilize CCHRS for their daily operations with 10,000+ transactions per day.

Status – Available Now (CCHRS-lite)

Sponsoring Agency – LA County Sheriff

Contact Rolf Embom at 562-403-6559 or rembom@isd.lacounty.gov



Where to from here?



A Variety of ID Ecosystem Perspectives

Is the ID Ecosystem only about identification and authentication?

Identity Provider



Jane Doe

Relying Party

Identity Provider



Jane Doe

DOB: 3 May 1985
Sex: F
Height: 5' 6"
Clearance: SECRET
28 CFR Part 23: YES
SLEO: YES
Employer: NYPD

Relying Party

Access Control Policy


Or are attributes and authorization fundamental to it?

A Variety of ID Ecosystem Perspectives



Will the ID Ecosystem have very few IDPs with consistent user bases and requirements?

Or a large number of IDPs with heterogeneous user bases and requirements?



A Variety of ID Ecosystem Perspectives

Will Trust Frameworks
remain static over time?

ID Trust
Framework



Or must they constantly
evolve to meet new
requirements?

Is it OK if the Trust Frameworks in the ID Ecosystem
are mostly non-interoperable and non-trusting
identity silos?

Trust Framework

Trust Framework

Trust Framework

Trust Framework


Trust Framework

Or does success demand that we at least provide a **viable strategy and framework for trust and interoperability** between various COIs, ISEs, and Federations?



What about a Trustmark Framework?

If the frameworks were modular...



...then we get:

Greater **transparency** of trust framework requirements


Greater **ease of comparability** between frameworks

Greater **potential for reusability** of framework components

And, most importantly:

Greater **potential for participation in multiple trust frameworks** by ID Ecosystem members with incremental effort and cost

What about a Trustmark Framework?



These modular components are called **Trustmarks**.

A Few Examples of Trustmarks


- ▲ FICAM SAML SSO Profile
- ✚ NIST 800-63 / FICAM LOA 3 Identity
- ◆ Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs)
- FIPS 200 Security Practices
- ★ GFIPM Metadata Registry (User Attributes)

Technical
Trust
Privacy
Security
Business


Trustmark Policies & Trustmark Agreements

Legal


A Trustmark-Based ID Ecosystem



A Trustmark-Based ID Ecosystem




A Trustmark-Based ID Ecosystem




Then each member of the community can acquire the necessary Trustmarks based on the TIP.


A Trustmark-Based ID Ecosystem




A Trustmark-Based ID Ecosystem




A Trustmark-Based ID Ecosystem



A Trustmark-Based ID Ecosystem



A Trustmark-Based ID Ecosystem



Members of the ID Ecosystem can query a Trustmark Registry to answer questions such as:

“What other members of the ID Ecosystem have the necessary Trustmarks to meet MY trust requirements?”



“What Trustmarks must I acquire to meet the trust requirements of <MEMBER>?”



A Trustmark-Based ID Ecosystem



Trustmarks – What? Where?



Sources of Components



GFIPM Trust & Interop Components

NIEF Trust & Interop Components

FICAM Trust & Interop Components

AAMVA Trust & Interop Components

Another Component Perspective




Creating Modular Common Components

Step 1: Gather trust and interop requirements from many frameworks

Step 2: Break down and reassemble requirements into modular, reusable components

Step 3: Express modularized requirements in a standard format to encourage broad reuse



GTRI NSTIC Pilot Trustmark Analysis

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
	TD Name	Source	In Use in NIEF?	Essential to Pilot?	Type	Related Periodic Trust Elements	Related TDs
1	FICAM Bona Fides IDPO TD	FICAM TFPAP, Section 3.3	n	y	bona fides	Identity vetting of	NIEF Bona Fides IDPO TD
2	FICAM LOA 2 Assertions TD	NIST SP 800-63-1, Chapter 9. FICAM TFPAP, Appendix A-2, Assertions.	n	y	policy: ID assurance		GFIPM SAML SSO Profile IDP TD. FICAM SAML SSO Profile IDP TD.
3	FICAM LOA 2 Authentication Process TD	NIST SP 800-63-1, Chapter 8. FICAM TFPAP, Appendix A-2, Authentication Process. NIEF Audit Policy, Section 4.1.4.	n	y	policy: ID assurance	Assurance - Authentication rules	
4	FICAM LOA 2 Registration and Issuance TD	NIST SP 800-63-1, Chapter 5. FICAM TFPAP, Appendix A-2, Registration and Issuance. NIEF Audit Policy, Section 4.1.1.	n	y	policy: ID assurance	Assurance - Identity proofing Assurance -	
5	FICAM LOA 2 Token and Credential Management TD	NIST SP 800-63-1, Chapter 7. FICAM TFPAP, Appendix A-2, Token and Credential Management. NIEF Audit Policy, Section 4.1.3.	n	y	policy: ID assurance	Assurance - Credential management	

117	ICAM BAE Metadata Consumption TD	ICAM BAE SAML Metadata Profile, Section 2	?	n	tech trust		GFIPM SAML Metadata Consumption TD
118	ICAM BAE SAML Protocol Requester TD	ICAM BAE SAML Profiles, Section 4	?	n	tech interop		GFIPM-WS Attribute Provider SIP AC TD
119	ICAM BAE SAML Protocol Responder TD	ICAM BAE SAML Profiles, Section 4	?	n	tech interop		GFIPM-WS Attribute Provider SIP AP TD
120	NIEF Bona Fides APO TD	NIEF Audit Policy, Section 4.5. NIEF Membership Agreement. NIEF APO Participation Agreement.	n	n	bona fides		
121	NIEF Bona Fides SCO TD	NIEF Audit Policy, Section 4.5. NIEF Membership Agreement. NIEF SCO Participation Agreement.	n	n	bona fides		
122	NIEF Bona Fides TIBO TD	NIEF Audit Policy, Section 4.5. NIEF Membership Agreement. NIEF TIBO Participation Agreement.	y	n	bona fides		

**122
distinct
trustmarks
identified
(so far)**

**Covers
FICAM,
GFIPM, &
NIEF
communities**

**Also covers
FIPPs
(privacy)
topics**

Trustmarks By Category

Identity Assurance Policy
(10 Total, 10 Essential to Pilot)

Security Policy
(18 Total, 18 Essential to Pilot)

Privacy Policy
(23 Total, 15 Essential to Pilot)

Attribute Assurance Policy
(2 Total, 2 Essential to Pilot)


Technical Interoperability
(57 Total, 8 Essential to Pilot)

Organizational Integrity / Bona Fides
(6 Total, 3 Essential to Pilot)


Technical Trust
(4 Total, 3 Essential to Pilot)

Usability
(2 Total, 0 Essential to Pilot)

Scope of the NSTIC Trustmark Pilot



High-Level Project Plan & Timeline



- Review the trustmark framework
 - Is the framework structured properly?
 - Who should review it to help make this determination?
- Review the TDs developed through the pilot
 - Do we have the right set of TDs?
 - What TDs are missing?
 - How well do existing TDs capture requirements from other existing trust frameworks in the ID Ecosystem?
- Facilitate participation by the “right” TDOs
 - What group is best suited to maintain each TD over time?
 - E.g., NIST, FICAM, industry groups and SDOs, etc.

Visit us at

<https://trustmark.gtri.gatech.edu>

